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APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO POLITICAL
PATRONAGE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION

Political patronage is "the allocation of the discretionary favors of government in exchange for political support." 1 In a patronage system, public officials may award jobs and promotions, or even fire employees,
solely on the basis of political affiliation.2 Abuses in patronage systems
led to the enactment of civil service laws,3 which greatly restricted the
role of political considerations in public employment decisions.4
The Supreme Court first addressed the impact of the first amendment'
on patronage dismissals in 1976. In Elrod v. Burns, 6 a plurality on the
Court stated that dismissing public employees because of their political
affiliation impermissibly restricted political belief and association. 7 The
Court limited the power of government employers to dismiss public employees for their political affiliation to policymaking positions.' The
Court adopted a balancing test based on Pickeringv. Boardof EducationI
and stated that "any contribution of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not suffice to override their severe encroachment on
First Amendment freedoms." 10
1. M. Tolchin, To The Victor 5 (1971).
2. See Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980); P. Van Riper, History of United States Civil Service 46 (1958).
3. See Loughney, 635 F.2d at 1065; P. Van Riper, supra note 2, at 6.
4. Typical of such statutes is the Government Organization and Employees Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 525 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 73217324 (1982)). For example, Section 7321 provides:
The President may prescribe rules which shall provide, as nearly as conditions
of good administration warrant, that an employee in an Executive agency or in
the competitive service is not obliged, by reason of that employment, to contribute to a political fund or to render political service, and that he may not be
removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusal to do so.
5 U.S.C. § 7321.
This Note will address employment practices not covered by civil service statutes.
5. The first amendment provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.., or the right of the people to peaceably assemble."
U.S. Const. amend. I. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the first amendment
protects certain forms of group activity. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430
(1963).
6. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
7. See id. at 355-60.
8. See id. at 367-68.
9. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Pickering, a teacher was dismissed for writing a letter
criticizing the school board. The Supreme Court held that where a government benefit is
denied due to the exercise of a constitutional right, a balancing test must be used to
determine the constitutionality of the denial. See id. at 568. The Court balanced the
employee's interest in free expression against the state's legitimate interest in the challenged practice. See id. In Pickering,the Court recognized the public employer's need to
promote efficiency in the services it performs through its employees, see id. at 568, which
may be achieved by allowing the employer to discipline workers. See id. at 570 n.3.
10. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
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Later, in Brand v. Finkel,1 the Court modified Elrod and established a
new test for considering the validity of patronage dismissals. Under the
Branti test, a patronage dismissal will be upheld when "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriaterequirement for the effective performance of the public office involved."'"
Together, Branti and Elrod enunciate broad principles governing the
application of the first amendment to patronage firings. 3 Lower courts,
however, have applied these principles inconsistently when patronage
motivates employment decisions which do not involve firing. For example, courts disagree whether a public employer may legitimately consider
an employee's political affiliation in decisions relating to hiring,' 4 rehiring,15 promotion,16 demotion17 and transfer. 8
Some courts, ignoring the potential benefits of political patronage,
strike down all patronage practices.' 9 Other courts uphold patronage
practices which arguably do not advance any legitimate governmental
interest.2 " Other courts adopt still another approach. This approach balances the government's interest in maintaining the patronage practice
against the first amendment interests of an employee or prospective
11. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
12. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
13. Many courts have complained that Elrod and Branti provide insufficient guidance
as to what is an appropriate requirement for a patronage dismissal. See, e.g., Brand, 445
U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting); Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037, 1043
(Ist Cir. 1988); Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1987).
14. Compare Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (political affiliation may
be considered in hiring decisions) and Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), with Indiana State Employees Ass'n. v. Indiana Republican State Cent. Comm., 630 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (use of political affiliation in
hiring decisions violates first amendment) and Torres v. Grunkmeyer, 601 F. Supp. 1043
(D. Wyo. 1985) (same).
15. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 848 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1988) (consideration of
political affiliation permissible in rehiring decisions), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d
943 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 881872).
16. See Rice v. Ohio Dep't. of Transp., No. 86-3312, slip op. at 5-6 (6th Cir. Oct. 13,
1989) (consideration of political affiliation permissible in promotion decisions); Rutan,
848 F.2d at 1396 (same).
17. See Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1988) (use of political affiliation
to justify retaliatory actions by government employers against employees violates first
amendment); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987) (use of political affiliation in
employment decisions violates first amendment).
18. See Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980) (use of political affiliation permissible in transfers not amounting to constructive discharges).
19. See Lieberman, 857 F.2d at 900; see also Bennis, 823 F.2d at 731-32. (while recognizing existence of balancing test, court did not balance potential benefits of political
patronage).
20. See, e.g., Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 674-79 (3d Cir. 1986) (consideration of
political affiliation permissible in awarding government contracts); Lafalce v. Houston,
712 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984); Loughney v.
Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1071 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert, J., concurring) (patronage necessary despite risk of restricting public servant's freedom of association).
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employee.2 '
This Note examines patronage practices in the non-firing context and
argues that the use of patronage is appropriate when the government can
show that its value in employment decisions outweighs the intrusion into
the employee's first amendment interests. Part I of this Note discusses
the history of political patronage and demonstrates that, when properly
used, patronage serves vital governmental interests. Part II examines the
Elrod2 2 and Branti23 decisions and the confusion they have engendered.
Part III suggests a balancing test that weighs the government's interest in
use of patronage against the extent of the intrusion into the plaintiff's
first amendment interests. This Note proposes that the plaintiff's property interest in a position be used to measure the intrusion that patronage
has on the plaintiff's first amendment rights. The balancing test is then
applied to various non-firing patronage-based employment decisions.
This Note concludes that consideration of political affiliation in certain
employment decisions does not violate the first amendment.
I.

POLITICAL PATRONAGE

Patronage has existed in American politics for over 200 years.24 Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln made use of political
patronage in their administrations.2 5 Moreover, patronage has played an
important role in bolstering the political party system. 26 It enables political parties, an essential element of our democratic system, 27 to en28
courage political party supporters to participate in the political process.
These incentives often include awarding employment to party supporters
and volunteers. 29
Before the enactment of civil service statutes, patronage practices were
21. See, e.g., Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1989); Rutan v. Republican
Party, 848 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1872); Avery
v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
22. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
23. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
24. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 378 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally C. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (1904) (history of political patronage in
the United States); H. Heclo, A Government of Strangers (1977) (same); P. Van Riper,
supra note 2 (same).
25. Commentators have credited Lincoln's use of patronage during the Civil War
with aiding in the preservation of the Union. See C. Fish, supra note 24, at 6-16, 105-33,
169-72; P. Van Riper, supra note 2, at 43.
26. Political parties ensure that the electorate is informed and provide candidates
with an organization to raise the funds necessary to capture the attention of the electorate. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 528 (1980). Political parties also "recruit potential candidates, train party workers, provide assistance to voters, and act as liaisons
between voters and governmental bureaucracies." Id. at 529 n. 11.
27. See id. at 528-29.
28. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 379 (1976).
29. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 529.
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widely abused."0 For example, officials often required employees to contribute to political funds or to render political service in exchange for
their jobs.3 1 Government employers sometimes rewarded supporters
with positions requiring little or no work.32 Abusive patronage practices
led to the enactment of civil service laws3 3 which replaced patronage systems with merit systems.
One of the goals of a patronage system is to promote governmental
efficiency. 3 4 For example, newly elected officials might use patronage to
streamline the process of appointing officials in their administrations.3 5
In a valid patronage system, party affiliation is not the sole determinant
in the appointment of officials; each new appointment must have the ability to perform the tasks required. 36 Moreover, the selection of individuals with similar political views helps to ensure that the policies mandated
by the electorate are carried out efficiently. 37 Furthermore, selecting and
retaining employees on the basis of political affiliation fosters a spirit of
common purpose38 and minimizes the disruptive effects of dissention.
Patronage, however, is not without its critics.3 9 For example, some
have suggested that patronage actually inhibits governmental effectiveness. 4 This view argues that patronage encourages the government to
hire applicants who are not necessarily the most competent, which in
turn threatens governmental quality and efficiency.
Arguments criticizing patronage systems, however, fail to take into account that pressures created by a patronage system also provide incen30. At the state level, in the 1960s and 70s, Mayor Daley of Chicago was notorious
for evading civil service laws and reinstituting pure patronage-based systems. See M.
Rokyo, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago 59-69 (1971). For example, in the days of
Daley's "Machine", he awarded no-show jobs and required employees to donate to a
political fund. See id. at 63, 67.
31. See Hatch Act, 1977: HearingBefore the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1973) (statement of Senator Stevens).
32. See M. Rokyo, supra note 30, at 59-68.
33. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1973); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 241/2, § 38t (1969); N.Y.
Civ. Serv. Law § 107 (McKinney 1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon 1962 &
Supp. 1989). In addition, many states have recently provided further safeguards against
unethical patronage practices by appointing independent ethics commissions to investigate employment practices. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1989, at B4, col. 1 (discussing
State Government Integrity Commission investigation into alleged patronage program in
New York City).
34. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
35. See Messer v. Curci, 877 F.2d 219, 233 (6th Cir. 1989); Brauer, Lost in Transition,
The Atlantic, Nov. 1988, at 74-75.
36. Cf Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 379 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting) (recognizing
a corresponding disadvantage of patronage in that it "also entail[s] costs to government
efficiency."). For example, persons whose primary qualifications are party affiliation
might be appointed instead of more qualified candidates.
37. See Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1065 (3rd Cir. 1980).
38. See H. Heclo, supra note 24, at 181-82.
39. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 379 (Powell, J., dissenting).
40. See id. (citing D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution 70-74
(1971)).
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tives for employees to perform.4 ' Employees appointed because of
patronage tend to be especially responsive to their superiors' directives.4 2

This responsiveness is motivated, in part, by political self-preservation.
Good performance by an employee reflects well on the patron, increasing
the chances that voters will return the official to office.4 3
The continued expansion of government bureaucracies underscores the
need to administer these organizations efficiently. 4 This can be accomplished by allowing the government to select, retain and promote employees partially on the basis of political affiliation.

II.

THE SUPREME COURT ON PATRONAGE DISMISSALS

A.

Elrod v. Burns

46

In Elrod v. Burns, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether patronage practices infringe upon first amendment interests. 47
A plurality struck down the patronage practice at issue, holding that firings 48 based on political affiliation are allowed only of employees who
function in policymaking roles. 49
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, stated that the patronage
practice at issue placed an impermissible restriction on freedoms of belief
and association with the political party of one's choice.5 ° Brennan concluded that a threatened dismissal for "failure to provide ... support
unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal
for failure to provide support only penalizes its exercise."'"
As the plurality noted, however, first amendment protections are not
absolute.5 2 Restraints on belief and association are permissible when the
41. See Loughney, 635 F.2d at 1065-67.
42. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 530 (1980).
43. See Loughney, 635 F.2d at 1065-67.
44. See H. Heclo, supra note 24, at 4.
45. See id. at 4-5.
46. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod involved three Republicans who were fired from their
non-civil service jobs solely "because they did not support and were not members of the
Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders." Id. at
351. Another employee was threatened with dismissal for the same reasons. See id. The
three dismissed employees brought a suit requesting an injunction to order reinstatement.
The other requested an injunction to prevent his discharge. See id. at 350.
47. See id. at 349.
48. The Court emphasized that the opinion dealt only with patronage dismissals. See
id. at 353.
49. See id. at 372.
50. See id. at 372-73 (Brennan, J. concurring).
51. Id. at 359.
52. See id. at 360. The first amendment appears to speak in absolute terms; if read
literally, competing interests would never be balanced. This absolutist view was espoused
by Justices Douglas and Black, but has never been adopted by a majority of the Court.
See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J. Young, Constitutional Law § 16.7, at 838 (3d ed. 1986).
The majority of first amendment controversies are decided by balancing the plaintiff's
interest in free expression against the state's legitimate interest in abridging those free-
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government has appropriate reasons.5 1 For a patronage practice to survive constitutional scrutiny, it must further some vital governmental purpose by means which are least restrictive of freedom of belief and
association and "the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights." 54 The Court held that employers' interests are
adequately protected where patronage practices are limited to those positions which require an employee to formulate policy." Furthermore, in
the firing context, the government's interest in promoting an efficient
workplace through patronage "does not suffice to override [the] severe
encroachment on First Amendment freedoms." 56
Justices Stewart and Blackmun, in concurring, did not believe the case
required a consideration of the value of political patronage.5 7 They saw
the issue as whether a government employee could be fired or threatened
with dismissal from a job "that he is satisfactorily performing upon the
sole ground of his political beliefs." "
Justice Powell dissented,5 9 arguing that the plurality ignored the benefits of patronage and its practical relevance."° Justice Powell contended
that political patronage has "played a significant role in democratizing
American politics." 61 He credited political patronage with strengthening
political parties,62 by providing incentives to those who participate in the
political process. Powell agreed in principle with the plurality that government employment ideally should not be conditioned upon one's political affiliation.6 3 He advanced, however, a pragmatic counter argument,
claiming that the plurality ignored the vital governmental need to attract
doms. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 Calif. L. Rev.
422, 438 (1980).
53. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
54. Id. at 363. The Elrod Court, however, did not give much weight to the government's justifications for its patronage system. See id. at 377-78. In Elrod, the government argued that patronage was necessary "to insure effective government and the
efficiency of public employees." Id. at 364. The government also argued that patronage
makes government more efficient "by giving the employees of an incumbent party the
incentive to perform well in order to insure their party's incumbency and thereby their
jobs." Id. at 366.
The Court recognized that there is "a vital need for government efficiency and effectiveness." Id. at 372. The Court, however, was not convinced that the "mere difference
of political persuasion motivates poor performance." Id. at 365. Moreover, the Court
determined that any benefits of efficiency were "at best marginal," see id. at 366, and that
dismissing employees for their non-political affiliation was "not the least restrictive means
for fostering that end." Id. at 372.
55. See id.at 367.
56. Id. at 373.
57. See id.at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 375.
59. See id.at 376 (Powell, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 376-89.
61. Id. at 379.
62. See id.at 379.
63. See id.at 381.
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volunteers, which may be achieved by the promise of patronage jobs.'
Justice Powell also concluded that employees who protest patronagebased employment decisions are often those who had originally benefitted from patronage.6 5 These employees, Powell believed, should "not be
heard to challenge it when it comes their turn to be replaced." 6 6 In a
patronage system volunteers are rewarded for their loyalty.67 By awarding volunteers with jobs or promotions, a patronage system may create
an expectation that a reward normally follows the rendering of volunteer
services. Therefore, the expectations of the beneficiaries of a patronage
system should also be taken into account.6"
B.

Branti v. Finkel

Four years after Elrod, the Court, in Branti v. Finkel,6 9 again considered the issue of patronage dismissals7" and clarified the Elrod test.
Rather than requiring the government to show that the dismissed employee was a policymaker, Branti required a government employer to
that party affiliation was an "appropriate requirement" for the
show
71
job.
The Court, in reformulating the test, distanced itself from Elrod by
noting the difficulty that Justice Brennan had in distinguishing between
policymaking and non-policymaking officials.7 2 The Branti Court stated
that "party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or
confidential position. The coach of a state university's football team formulates policy, but no one could seriously claim that Republicans make
better coaches than Democrats, or vice versa, no matter which party is in
control of the state government." 7 3 The Court concluded that the Elrod
test could not be easily applied,7 4 and refocused the inquiry on whether
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the particular public office.7 5
In applying the new test, the Branti Court ruled that the government
could not condition the employment of an assistant public defender upon
64. See id. at 385.
65. See id. at 380.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 385.
68. See id. at 380.
69. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). In Branti, two assistant public defenders brought an action
to prevent the public defender from discharging them because of their political affiliation.
The trial court determined that because respondents were neither policymaking nor confidential employees, they were protected by the test established by Elrod. See id. at 5 10-11.
70. In Branti, like in Elrod, the Court limited its consideration to patronage firings.
See id. at 513 n.7. ("In [Elrod], as in this [case], ... the only practice at issue [is] the
dismissal of public employees for partisan reasons.") (emphasis added).
71. See id. at 518.
72. See id. (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976)).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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allegiance to a political party.76 To do so, the Court found, would undermine the effective performance of the public defender's office.77 The public defender was consequently enjoined from dismissing the assistant
public defenders on patronage grounds.7 8
Justice Powell again wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing that the patronage practice should be upheld and that "[t]he Court largely ignore[d]
the substantial governmental interests served by patronage." 79 Powell
offered many of the same defenses of patronage that he had set forth in
his Elrod dissent.8 "
Although Branti articulated a new test for patronage firings, 8 1 the case
did not address the difficult questions that arise in determining whether
the use of party affiliation is appropriate in non-firing employment decisions.8 2 Lower courts have subsequently disagreed as to which standard
is appropriate in the non-firing context.8 3 Some courts view the use of
political affiliation in non-firing decisions as a violation of the first
amendment.8 4 Recently, however, other courts have reassessed the value
of political patronage, finding that in some circumstances use of patronage serves vital governmental interests.8
In view of the confusion among courts addressing patronage employment questions and in light of the lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court, there is a need for a structured, logical framework for judicial
76. See id. at 519-20.
77. See id. at 519.
78. See id. at 520.
79. Id. at 522 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 520-34; supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 13.
83. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1988); Bennis v. Gable,
823 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987); Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1984). For example,
the court in Brady v. Patterson, 515 F. Supp. 695 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), did not balance the
competing interests and held that Branti stood for the proposition that politics cannot be
used as a factor in employment decisions. See id. at 698. The court in Brady stated that
"[d]efendants have not cited, and the Court's research has not disclosed any legal authority for the proposition that Branti has no application to failure to reappoint cases." Id. at
699.
85. See, e.g., Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (political affiliation may be
used in making non-firing employment decisions); Rutan v. Republican Party, 848 F.2d
1396 (7th Cir. 1988) (same), affd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1872); Avery v. Jennings, 786
F.2d 233 (6th Cir.) (political affiliation may be used as a criterion in making hiring decisions), cert denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986); Visser v. Magnarelli, 530 F. Supp. 1165
(N.D.N.Y. 1982). In Visser, which involved a failure to reappoint on the basis of political
affiliation, the court found a violation, but noted "[i]t
is to be hoped that in light of the
inadequate attention paid to patronage's benefits in the Supreme Court's balancing test,
the inherently broad ramifications contained in the Elrod-Brantiprinciples, and the uncertainty created by Branti's nebulous test for determining permissible patronage practices, the Supreme Court will reconsider the wisdom of its two decisions." Id. at 1175.
Visser emphasized the salutary features of political patronage set forth in the dissent in
Elrod. See id. at 1174.
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consideration of patronage employment decisions outside of the firing
context.
III.

AN EFFICIENT BALANCING TEST

A.

Factorsto Consider

Courts can best ensure a fair and practical resolution of patronage employment disputes by applying a balancing test that weighs the extent of
the alleged first amendment deprivation against the benefit resulting from
the use of patronage in the employment decision. On one side of the
balance, courts should focus on whether the patronage practice at issue
yields any identifiable benefit for the government.8 6 An employment decision that is purely a retaliatory measure, for example, should always be
struck down as inappropriate.8 7 Conversely, when a patronage-based
employment decision advances legitimate governmental goals-such as
enhancing efficiencySS-courts should consider whether those benefits
outweigh the concomitant intrusion into the plaintiff's first amendment
interests.8 9
86. This approach does not recreate an atmosphere ripe for abuse because "[c]ivil
service... already adequately shelter[s] most public employees from patronage problems.
The small pocket left by the legislative and executive branches for a modified spoils system to play a role should be given deference, not short shrift, by the 'least dangerous'
branch." Visser, 530 F. Supp. at 1174.
87. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that retaliatory harassment falling short of actual
or constructive discharge is actionable as a violation of the first amendment. See Bart v.
Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit has also noted that
"acts of retaliation must be distinguished from favored treatment of political supporters
that has the incidental effect of making a non-supporter no better off." Rutan, 868 F.2d
at 954 n.4.
88. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
89. See Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989); Rutan v. Republican Party,
848 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1272).
One court has indicated that the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits
provide more protection than Branti and Elrod and apply the equivalent of a per se rule
against the use of political affiliation in making demotion decisions. See Messer v. Curci,
881 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir. 1989); cf Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2nd Cir.
1988); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F. 2d 723 (3d Cir. 1987).
An analysis of the Second and Third Circuits' reasoning shows that the Sixth Circuit's
characterization of the two circuits is correct. For example, the court in Bennis rejected
the idea that in order to receive judicial protection, the employment decision must be the
"'substantial equivalent of dismissal.'" Bennis, 823 F.2d at 731 n.9 (quoting Delong v.
United States, 621 F.2d 618, 623 (4th Cir. 1980)). The court extended protection to "any
disciplinary action." Id. at 731. In Bennis, a chief of police demoted the plaintiff to boost
morale. The court held that "the constitutional violation is not in the harshness of the
sanction applied, but in the imposition of any disciplinary action for the exercise of permissible free speech." Id. (emphasis added). The Bennis court held that the Pickering
balancing test was pertinent, see supra note 9, but did not balance the government's interest in maintaining a patronage system.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Lieberman, adopted the Bennis reasoning and stated that "to affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's ... cause of action might
condone politically motivated harassment or other unconstitutional treatment of public
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The responsibilities of a particular position should also be a factor in
determining whether the application of patronage is appropriate.9" The
use of patronage alone to make an employment decision concerning a
purely ministerial91 position is especially difficult for the government to
justify.9 2 On the other hand, as the Supreme Court stated in Elrod, if the
disputed position is discretionary,9493 patronage is more likely to serve a
legitimate governmental interest.
The extent to which the government uses political affiliation in an employment decision is another factor to consider in the non-firing context.
Because the central purpose of government is to serve general, non-partisan interests, 95 an employment decision that is based solely on political
affiliation should not be upheld. 96
Balanced against the government's interest is the plaintiff's first
amendment right to freedom of belief and association. The difficultly in
analyzing patronage-based employment decisions has been quantifying
the degree of intrusion into a plaintiff's first amendment interests. In
order to solve this problem, courts should look for guidance to an area of
constitutional analysis that addresses analogous concerns. Under the
fourteenth amendment, the degree of intrusion into a plaintiff's interests
has been measured according to the existing property interest in a particular position or right to promotion.97
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,9 8 a case analyzed under the
employees in those cases where the public employer's action stops short of actual discharge." Lieberman, 857 F.2d at 900. The result in Lieberman would be the same using
a balancing test. Politically motivated harassment of employees cannot legitimately promote efficiency or other governmental ends. In contrast, rationally based patronage demotions may withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Both Bennis and Lieberman illustrate the long-rejected absolutist view that balancing
tests should not be applied to first amendment issues. See Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Both cases, while providing over-expansive protection to employees, limit the government's capacity to implement structural
changes which could increase efficiency.
90. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
91. "Ministerial" has been defined as a duty "'in respect to which nothing is left to
discretion.'" In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488 n.21 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other
groundssub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988) (quoting National Treasury
Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 607-08 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Mississippi v.
Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 498 (1867))).
92. See Torres v. Grunkmeyer, 601 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Wyo. 1985). In Torres, the
court stated that it is difficult for defendants to show that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for not hiring a janitor. See id. at 1047.
93. "Discretionary" has been defined as that in which there is "room for policy judgment and decision." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36 (1953).
94. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976).
95. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 354 (1976).
96. See Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905
(1986). But see Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219 (1989).
97. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (untenured state college
professor lacked sufficient property interest to support due process claim); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (same).
98. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).

1989]

POLITICAL PA TRONAGE

Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, petitioners contended that a school board's policy of preferential treatment of minorities
in layoffs was discriminatory.9 9 The Supreme Court held that the layoff
plan "disrupted settled expectations"" and therefore was too intrusive
to withstand constitutional scrutiny.' ° The Court suggested, however,
that hiring policies to remedy past racial discrimination would be less
burdensome because the affected class had less of an interest in the disputed positions."' 2
Wygant's distinction between existing and expectant interests has been
extended to cases where patronage-based employment decisions are challenged on first amendment grounds. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Rutan v. Republican Party,"°3 employed the Wygant analysis to
distinguish firings from non-firing decisions in the first amendment context."° In Rutan, plaintiffs complained that they were denied either employment, promotion or transfer because of their political affiliation. 10 5
The court, citing Wygant, struck down the plaintiffs' claims, reasoning
that "losing an employment opportunity is not as intrusive as losing an
existing job."10' 6 The Rutan court distinguished an existing employee's
interest from that of a job applicant. 107 While an "employee on the job
has an important stake in his position,"10 the court noted that an applicant's interest in a position is less substantial because the potential employee "has not arranged his affairs around any expectation of an income
stream."' 1 9 The court also noted that existing employees have different
interests in their positions, 110 holding that failure to promote an employee, however disappointing, is significantly less disruptive than firing
an employee.1 1 The panel decision in Rutan was recently 11upheld
by the
2
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in an en banc decision.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Messer v.
Curci,"3 adopted the approach used in Wygant to measure the intrusion
into the plaintiff's first amendment interests. Messer involved plaintiffs
who complained that other applicants were given preferential treatment
based on their political activities.' 14 The court noted that there is a sig99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 273.
Id. at 283.
See id. at 283.
See id.
848 F.2d 1396.
See id. at 1405-06.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1405-06.
Id. at 1406.
Id.
Id.

110. See id.
111. See id.

112. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert.
granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1272).
113. See Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1989).
114. See id. at 220.
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nificant difference between the decision to fire and the decision to hire an
employee." 5 The Messer court concluded that "as noted in Wygant, the
pain to the individual from a certainty of loss of existing employment is
much greater than the loss of some possibility of employment."" ' 6 In
this scenario, the government's interest in "effective and vigorous government" 117 outweighed the plaintiff's minimal interest in an applied for
position."18
Messer and Rutan indicate that one method of quantifying an intrusion
upon the plaintiff's first amendment interests in patronage-based employment claims is to determine whether the plaintiff possesses a property
interest in the post.' 19 A property interest exists when the government
115. See id. at 223.
116. Id.
117. See id. The court in Messer argued that patronage hirings, especially at the lower
levels, will enhance the spirit of an administration. See id. The court held that hiring
decisions involving non-discretionary employees based on patronage alone was constitutional. See id. This holding represents a departure from Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
The Messer conclusion is questionable. The use of patronage as the sole criterion in an
employment decision involving non-discretionary employees should be avoided because
government is meant to serve non-partisan interests. See supra note 96. Furthermore,
such practices intrude substantially into an individual's first amendment interests. See
Torres v. Grunkmeyer, 601 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Wyo. 1985).
118. See Messer, 881 F.2d at 233. The Messer court, after deciding that the plaintiff
did not possess a sufficient interest to allege a constitutional violation, dismissed the complaint on the failure to state a claim. See id. at 220. The court was justified in using the
plaintiff's interest in the position to quantify first amendment -interests. See supra notes
113-118 and accompanying text. The court, however, should not have dismissed the
plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim.
An important distinction exists between claims brought under the fourteenth amendment and those brought under the first amendment. To establish a due process claim
under the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff must first establish that there exists either
a property or liberty interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972);
Thomas v. Board of Examiners, 866 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1433 (1989). When the plaintiff fails to do so, the cause of action will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. See Thomas, 866 F.2d at 227. On the other hand, under the first
amendment, the plaintiff's failure to establish an existing property interest in the position
alone should not bar the plaintiff's claim. While such a claim may be weak, see infra
notes 127-138, the first amendment, because of its central importance to our democractic
process, requires that the claim receive judicial scrutiny. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 65 (1975). The Messer court's willingness to dismiss the plaintiff's claim merely because the interest was expectant, therefore, seems unjustified.
119. Both Messer and Rutan use vague labels to measure the intrusion into the plaintiff's first amendment interests. The Rutan court referred to the "stake" an employee has
in a position and the "disappointment" in not getting a promotion. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 848 F.2d 1396, 1406 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 948
(7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1272).
The Messer court referred to the "pain" of losing an existing job. See Messer, 881 F.2d
219 at 233. While these terms aid in a first amendment analysis, they do not provide
complete guidance on how to quantify any intrusion into the plaintiff's interests. A more
concrete way to quantify plaintiff's interest is to focus on the distinction between an
existing employment position and a desired, but not yet existent position. The former is
defined as a "vested property interest" whereas the latter is a "non-vested property inter-
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recognizes that a plaintiff has an entitlement.12 In the first amendment
context, where a vested property interest 121 in government employment
is present, political affiliation has been found not to be an appropriate
condition for the retention of a governmental position. 122 In other
words, when balanced against the government's interest in the use of patronage, the plaintiff's first amendment interest is too substantial to allow
patronage-based employment decisions. Conversely, when the plaintiff
does not have a vested property interest in the disputed position, the balance shifts in favor of the government.1 23 These interests, when balanced
against the government's interest in using political patronage, will not
normally rise to the level of a constitutional violation.124
B.

The Balancing Test in the Non-Firing Context

A balancing test represents a starting point for judicial examination of
employment decisions which do not amount to a dismissal. The specific
manner in which the test is applied will vary depending on the parties
and the circumstances of a particular case. Application of the test to the
most common non-firing situations, however, confirms that the test will
prove to be useful
in determining the appropriateness of a particular use
25
of patronage.1
est." Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (discussing requirements
for determining property interest).
120. Courts have long recognized that an employee may have a property interest in a
position. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Roth, 408 U.S. at 577-78.
An entitlement exists when the government recognizes that an individual is legally
entitled to a benefit. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Thomas, 866 F.2d at 227.
121. A vested property interest is one where the individual has present rights and not
merely rights for which the individual has applied. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 578; supra note
119.
122. Implicit in Branti and Elrod was the concern that the plaintiffs were being deprived of a property interest. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980); Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 359 (1976).
123. A determination that a plaintiff does not have a property interest should weigh
heavily against him, but should not preclude his claim. When the employee does not
have a vested property interest, first amendment interests still exist and must be scrutinized. See supra note 119.
124. See, e.g., Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1989); Rutan v. Republican
Party, 848 F.2d 1396, 1408 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1972); Avery
v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986).
125. Balancing the various factors demonstrates that as the range of a public employer's action shifts from firing to failure to hire, the infringement on the plaintiff's first
amendment rights generally lessens while the government's position in maintaining a patronage system grows stronger. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Avery v.
Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), recognized the distinction between patronage dismissals and less burdensome practices. An informal hiring
practice favoring one party over another is a burden, but not enough to rise to the level of
a constitutional deprivation. See id. at 236. Avery also distinguished an intentional, strict
political test and a "patronage system that relies on family, friends and political allies for
recommendations." Id. at 237. An informal system which prefers members of one's own
party is "natural and reasonable." Id. at 235. But see Note, Patronageand the First
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There is a broad range of employment actions-such as demotionswhich affect the nature of a government worker's employment, but which
do not amount to firing.12 6 In determining whether a demotion based on
patronage amounts to a first amendment violation, courts should carefully examine the employer's motive for the decision. For example,
where a demotion is found to be retaliatory, the employee could prove a
violation of the first amendment because the intrusion into his first
amendment interests would be substantial, while there would be no legitimate countervailing government interest served by the retaliation.
In cases of denied promotions, government employers will have less
difficulty demonstrating that a patronage based decision did not violate
an employee's first amendment rights.12 7 An employee's interest in a
promotion usually consists only of an expectation.12 8 Therefore, when
the minor intrusion into the plaintiff's first amendment interests is balanced against the government's interest, the plaintiff will likely lose.
Moreover, an employee who is a party member is likely to have a greater
expectation of promotion then does a non-member.12 9 If a non-member
accepts a position knowing that a patronage system exists and his work is
substantially the same quality as that of a party supporter, the government should be allowed to give preferential treatment to the party
supporter. 130
Amendment After Elrod v. Bums, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 468, 474-75 (1978) (arguing that
burdens on plaintiff in non-firing context are almost identical to those in firing context).
126. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recognized that an
employee may be constructively discharged from his position when the employer's action
requires the employee either to accept new and onerous conditions or to resign. See
Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 1980). Under Delong, if a court
finds that an employer's action amounts to the substantial equivalent of a dismissal, the
employee will receive the protections of Elrod and Branti. See id. at 623-24. The Delong
court articulated a test to determine whether a given employment action amounts to a
constructive discharge. Under this test, "[t]he ultimate issue ... is whether, all things
considered, the challenged reassignment and transfer can reasonably be thought to have
imposed so unfair a choice between continued employment and the exercise of protected
beliefs and associations as to be tantamount to the choice imposed by threatened dismissal." Id. at 624. This determination requires a factual inquiry into the "objective and
subjective factors pertaining to the office holder's expectations and reliance upon the continuation of particular assignments and geographical locations in his employment." Id.
The court added that only "reasonable expectations and reliance should be weighed in
the balance." Id.
127. See Rice v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., No. 86-3312, slip op. at 5-6 (6th Cir. Oct. 13,
1989); Rutan v. Republican Party, 848 F.2d 1396, 1408 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1872).
128. Sometimes, however, there may exist a property interest in a promotion. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972). For example, courts have recognized
that where a de facto promotion system exists, an employee may have a property interest
in being promoted. In Perry, the Court held that a property interest in tenure need not
arise out of a contract or statute, but may be based on a de facto tenure program. See id.
129. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 380 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. See id.; Loughney v. Hickey, 635 F.2d 1063, 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). Giving the
government the latitude to consider political affiliation in promotion decisions will also
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The government's decision not to reappoint an employee may also be
based on political affiliation. When a plaintiff complains that he was not
reappointed to his position because of the operation of patronage,1 31 his
claim is weak; the employee lacks both an identifiable property interest in
his position and an expectation of reappointment. 132 If the employee has
a contractual right to be reappointed, a violation can more easily be

demonstrated. 133
The initial decision to hire an employee may be based in part on political affiliation. In this context, the prospective employee's case is very
weak because he has neither a property nor an expectation interest in the
position he is seeking. 134 Conversely, the government in this context has
a great interest in hiring only those employees it believes can perform
efficiently in the workplace. 13 1 In challenges to hiring decisions, courts
should examine the type of position involved. Political affiliation should
not be used as the sole criterion for hiring non-discretionary employees. 136 It may be appropriate to use political affiliation, on the other
hand, as a criteria in hiring other professional employees. 137 Moreover,
the employer has a greater interest in using political affiliation as a criterion in making a hiring decision because, unlike other employment deciminimize the number of suits brought by disappointed public employees who fail to receive promotions. See Rutan, 848 F.2d at 1407.
131. See, e.g., Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 234 (3d Cir. 1986); Tanner v.
McCall, 625 F.2d 1183, 1186 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1980).
132. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 848 F.2d 1396, 1406 (7th Cir. 1988), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 1989) (No. 88-1872).
The Third and Fifth Circuits hold, however, that the use of patronage in rehiring violates protected first amendment rights. For example, the court in Tanner v. McCall, 625
F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907 (1980), held that Branti applies to failure
to reappoint. See id. at 1186; accord Brady v. Patterson, 515 F. Supp. 695 (N.D.N.Y.
1981). In Tanner,however, the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proving discrimination based on their political affiliation. See Tanner, 625 F.2d at 1195. In Furlong v.
Grunkmeyer, 808 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit used the same standard for
firing and failure to reappoint. Id. at 237-38.
133. See supra note 128.
134. See Messer v. Curci, 881 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1989); cf Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1971) (no property interest in reappointment on conclusion of
employment term). Some courts, however, find no reason to distinguish between firing
and hiring. For example, in Indiana State Employees Ass'n v. Indiana Republican State
Cent. Comm., 630 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. Ind. 1986), the court, in a failure to hire case in
which political affiliation was one of the criteria used by the public employer, held that
"[t]he refusal to hire someone based on political beliefs can chill a person's first amendment rights as easily as firing someone for political reasons." Id. at 1196.
Although first amendment rights are chilled by being denied employment partly because of political affiliation, the deprivation is not enough to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986).
135. See Messer v. Curi, 881 F.2d 219, 223 (6th Cir. 1989).
136. See supra note 95.
137. See Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905
(1986).
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sions, the employer may have little information available upon which to
make a decision.138
CONCLUSION

Patronage allows the government to make employment decisions
which may enhance its ability to serve its citizens more efficiently. When
considering the role of patronage in public employment decisions, courts
should use a balancing test which takes into account the government's
interest in using a political patronage system. At the same time, the test
should consider the potential harmful effects that public employers' adverse actions may have on the employee's first amendment interests.
Louis Cammarosano
138. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 530 (1980) (Powell, J. dissenting).

